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Abstract—Parallelization is featured by DNS recursive servers
to do time-consuming recursions on behalf on clients. As common
DNS configurations, recursive servers should allow a reasonable
timeout for each recursion which may take as long as several
seconds. However, it is proposed in this paper that recursion
parallelization may be exploited by attackers to compromise the
recursion timeout mechanism for the purpose of DoS or DDoS
attacks. Attackers can have recursive servers drop early existing
recursions in service by saturating recursion parallelization. The
key of the proposed attack model is to reliably prolong service
times for any attacking queries. As means of prolong service
times, serval techniques are proposed to effectively avoiding
cache hit and prolonging overall latency of external DNS lookups
respectively. The impacts of saturated recursion parallelization
on timeout are analytically provided. The testing on BIND servers
demonstrates that with carefully crafted queries, an attacker
can use a low or moderate level of query load to successfully
overwhelm a target recursive server from serving the legitimate
clients.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Domain Name System (DNS) plays a critical role in
today’s Internet. It translate human friendly domain names
into machine readable IP addresses, which is indispensable for
Internet addressing and routing. The design of DNS basically
follows the client-server model. The server side consists of
recursive server and authoritative server. Recursive server
performs iterative name resolution on behalf of client. And
authoritative server provides authoritative response to queriers.
As an DNS agent between DNS user and DNS database,
recursive server processes user requests and traverses the DNS
tree to reach final answer. Given its heavy tasks and compli-
cated interoperations, the design space of recursive server is
very complex, with many optimization proposals emerging in
recent years [1]-[8]. Its performance and security are of great
importance to the stability, resilience, and security of the DNS
as a whole [9]-[22]. There have been extensive studies on
the securities of recursive server [28]-[41] in the past decade.
However, little attention was given to the parallelization char-
acterized by recursive server. This paper is the first to explore
the security implications of parallelization in recursive server.
A new vulnerability is discovered to potentially cause Denial
of Service on recursive server.
II. PARALLELIZATION FEATURED BY RECURSIVE
SERVERS
Without reliance on external DNS lookups, an authoritative
server generates responses based on the local DNS informa-
tion, namely the authoritative zone stored locally. So the query
processing delay of an authoritative server is only dependent
of its processing capability (whose bottleneck is affected by
CPU, memory, hard drive, etc.). It usually takes no more than
the order of microsecond to process a query for an authoritative
server.
With the responsibility of finding the final answer to a
recursion-desired query, a recursive server may look up exter-
nal authoritative servers following the referrals obtained by far.
The recursive process may cost several RTTs when multiple
zone cuts take place from the nearest domain in cache to the
target domain. So the query processing delay of a recursive
server is mostly determined by the external lookups involved
in the recursive resolution [25]. For example, if two external
lookups are needed and each costs 200 ms, the total query
processing delay is about 400ms. Unlike authoritative servers,
the internal processing delay is negligible for recursive servers.
Given the big difference in query processing delay between
authoritative servers and recursive servers, the parallelization
is totally different between them. Authoritative servers do not,
in essence, need high parallelization in handling the incoming
queries. They can process queries in a FCFS queue. By con-
trary, recursive servers are often dominated by parallelization
in processing queries. A number of concurrent queries should
be processed in parallel by recursive servers.
III. THE CONFIGURATION OF RECURSION
PARALLELIZATION AND TIMEOUT IN BIND AND OTHER
DNS SERVERS
Each recursion, of course, consumes an mount of memory.
To limit the memory usage of parallel recursions, BIND allows
the configuration of maximum recursions. The default is 1000.
Some recursions may take unreasonably long times. To cut
the time waiting for the excessively delayed responses, BIND
allows to configure the amount of time the recursive resolver
will spend attempting to resolve a recursive query before
failing. The default and minimum is 10 and the maximum
is 30.
Some other DNS servers also provide their users the oppor-
tunity of configuring recursion parallelization and timeout to
optimize performance and ensure reliability.
IV. TIMEOUT IMPACTED BY THE SATURATED RECURSION
PARALLELIZATION
In BIND, recursive-clients defines a ”hard quota” limit for
pending recursive clients: when more clients than this are
pending, new incoming requests will not be accepted, and for
each incoming request a previous pending request will also be
dropped. A ”soft quota” is also set. When this lower quota is
exceeded, incoming requests are accepted, but for each one, a
pending request will be dropped. If recursive-clients is greater
than 1000, the soft quota is set to recursive-clients minus 100;
otherwise it is set to 90% of recursive-clients. A recursion may
be dropped before it really times out when the lower quota is
exceeded.
If the attacker can manage to accumulate the parallel
recursions to the lower quota, the recursive service will be
subject to a Denial-of-Service (DoS) or Distributed Denial-
of-Service (DDoS) attack. Unlike the type of DoS or DDoS
attacks on recursive servers which leverage cache poisoning to
inject bogus data into responses [23], [24], the proposed new
attack model can never be alleviated by DNSSEC.
V. QUANTIFYING THE IMPACTS
Let the limit of recursive clients (recursive-clients) be L,
the maximum inbound query rate be Q, and the minimum
real query timeout be T .
The impacts of saturated recursion parallelization on time-
out can be expressed as
L = Q ∗ T (1)
If each recursive client consumes U unit of memory, we
have the minimum memory requirement for the recursive
server as
M = L ∗ U (2)
Example 1. Let the recursive-clients be the default (1000),
the query rate issued by the attacker be 1000 qps. Then the
real query timeout will be 1 s, which is much shorter than the
default (10 s). It is not uncommon for a DNS lookup to cost
more than 500 ms. Then if a recursion takes more than two
DNS lookups, it may be dropped early before it times out as
intended.
Example 2. What if the query rate is 10,000 qps? That
query rate is usually not seen as a DDoS attack. The real
query timeout will be 100 ms. Many recursions will be lost
due to the early discarding.
Example 3. Let the effective query timeout and recursive-
clients be both the defaults, namely 10s and 1000 respectively,
the maximum attacking query rate will be as small as 100 qps.
So the expected query timeout is readily to fail.
Example 4. BIND is reported to need about 20KB memory
usage per recursive client. Let the effective query timeout be
the default, namely 10s, and the maximum inbound query
rate allowed (or not limited) be 100k qps. Then the min-
imum memory required for the recursive service will be
10*100k*20k=20GB.
VI. SERVICE TIME MATTERS FOR THE ATTACKS
However, the attacking queries do not necessarily take effect
if they cannot be served for a sufficient time. They should at
least result in a service time of real query timeout. We can
calculate the minimum service times for the four examples
discussed above.
Example 1. The minimum service time is 1s.
Example 2. The minimum service time is 100 ms.
Example 3. The minimum service time is 10 s.
Example 4. The minimum service time is 10 s.
VII. HOW TO RELIABLY PROLONG THE SERVICE TIME?
Most recursions will either hit the cache or end with a
limited number of prompt external DNS lookups. However,
there are still several techniques to achieve a reliably long
service time.
A. Avoiding Cache Hit
Cache hit is, of course, unfavorable for a long service time,
since the response can be generated immediately from the
cache. So the attacker has to use some techniques to get around
the caching.
1) Randomizing query names: DNS caching mechanism
searches for the item in cache that exactly matches the query
name in question. So if query names may be sufficiently
randomized, there is little chance of repeated query names
within one TTL and thus the cache hit rate will be close to
zero [26] (illustrated in the question in blue in Fig. 1).
2) Requesting for authoritative records with a zero TTL:
DNS caching mechanism keeps the data in cache for a duration
that specified in the TTL field of the relevant record. So when
the TTL is set zero, the associated record is just used for
responding once and then dropped immediately (illustrated in
the question in red in Fig. 1). The attack can use any existent
authoritative records on the DNS name space with a zero TTL.
To ensure the constant availability of and the reliable access
to such records, the attack can also create some authoritative
records with a zero TTL, or even set up a dedicated DNS zone
with records of a zero TTL.
B. Increasing Overall Latency of External DNS Lookups
In most cases, avoiding cache hit alone cannot guarantee
a long service time, because most DNS authoritative servers
provide response delay as low as no more than 50 ms in a bid
to optimize user perceived performance. Here we propose two
means of prolonging overall latency of external DNS lookups.
1) Causing many external DNS lookups: If one external
DNS lookup is not enough, many a lookup makes a long
service time. Using a long CNAME/DNAME chain or using
query names with deep labels helps to produce many external
DNS lookups.
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Fig. 1. Techniques of avoiding cache hit.
2) Requesting the slowly responding domains: A slowly
responding domain is surely able to add to the service time.
There are two ways of making slowly responding domain
available.
• Finding slowly responding domains on the Internet. The
method is to test some candidate domains in operation,
and filter out those with relatively quick responses. In
order to measure the real response time between the
target recursive server and the authoritative server, the
test procedure can be detailed as follows:
1) Send a request for a testing domain to the target
recursive server and get the response (Step 1 and 2 in
Fig. 2).
2) Check the TTL in the response. And within that TTL,
send the same request again to the target recursive server
(Step 3 in Fig. 2). Measure the RTT of that response.
And that RTT is the estimation of the RTT between the
client (attacker) and the target recursive server, which
is denoted by Rc. The first request intends to make the
response cached by the recursive server and the second
request intends to get the response immediately from the
cache.
3) Send a request for a candidate domain to the target
recursive server and get the response.
4) Check the TTL of the authoritative zones NS RRset in
the response. And within that TTL, send another request
for a randomized domain within that authoritative zone
to the target recursive server (Step 4 in Fig. 2). The
second request is expected to miss the cache and trigger
an outstanding query for the authoritative zone. Measure
the RTT of the second response. And that RTT is the RTT
between the client (attacker) and the target recursive
server plus the RTT between the target recursive server
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Fig. 2. Procedure of measuring response delay.
and the authoritative servers, which is denoted by Rt.
5) Finally, the RTT between the target recursive server
and the authoritative servers can be estimated by
Ra = Rt −Rc.
Since one authoritative zone may have multiple
authoritative servers and the target recursive server may
select one server from them to query each time. Most
server selection algorithms make every server have a
chance to be selected [27].
To ensure all authoritative servers for a candidate
domain are located far enough from the target recursive
server, that candidate domain should be measured
enough times, but, of course, using different randomized
domains. So each authoritative server should have an
opportunity to be measured. And By checking if all
measurements for a domain exceed the minimum delay,
we can ensure the slow responses from that domain.
• Setting up malicious slowly responding domains. To
facilitate the attack, the attacker can host malicious slowly
responding domains which are targets of the attacking
queries.
VIII. TESTING
We configured a BND recursive server (BIND 9.10.4-P1,
which is the most recent stable version of BIND) with the
default recursive-clients (1000) and timeout (10s).
”auditionsea.com” was selected as the requested domain of
attacking queries. It was tested to have response delay of more
than 500 ms using the measurement technique detailed above.
We used resperf to generate a query rate of 5000 qps for
randomized query names towards the recursive server.
At the same time, we used a client as a legitimate client to
generate a query rate of 1 qps towards the recursive server. We
select ”whois.net” as the requested domain of that legitimate
client. It was tested to have response delay of more than 200
ms using the measurement technique detailed above. Since
both ”auditionsea.com” and ”whois.net” satisfy the minimum
service time required per Eq.(1), they are expected to be
dropped early by the recursive server under the attack as we
discussed above.
After the initial bootstrap, all queries, for both ”audi-
tionsea.com” and ”whois.net”, were observed to receive the
SERVFAIL responses from the recursive server. Those results
meet our expectations. And it demonstrates that the attacker
can use a low or moderate level of query load to success-
fully overwhelm the target recursive server from serving the
legitimate clients.
To better understand the testing results, we captured the
query and response trace for further analysis. We find that all
queries indeed got around the cache and triggered external
queries as we expected, since the outgoing queries matching
the incoming queries were observed from the recursive server.
We also find that those outbound queries were successfully
responded with NXDOMAIN by the authoritative servers
because of their randomized query names. However, those
responses were observed to arrive at the recursive server
only to be discarded, because because there were no longer
outstanding processes pending for them.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
Parallelization is indispensable for DNS recursive servers
to maintain good throughput. However, this paper proposed
that parallelization also imposes DoS or DDoS risks for
recursive servers. In the proposed attack model, carefully
crafted DNS queries are employed to saturate parallelization
of recursive servers and thereby persistently overwhelm the
recursive services. The testing on BIND validated the proposed
attack model.
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